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Greed is Good, for Patients: How the 
Biotechnology Industry Saves Lives, One Gene 
Patent at a Time 
By Nikki Buck* 
¶1  A debate is raging over the constitutionality of gene patents and their effect on the 
availability of genetic diagnostics and therapies.  Whether gene patents are in fact 
constitutional is for the courts to decide.  Rather, this Comment will argue that patents for 
isolated human genes positively affect society as a whole, with particular emphasis on 
patients in need of genetic innovations.  Gene patents elevate genetic engineering beyond 
the realm of basic science and spur important advances in therapeutic technology. 
¶2  Part I(A) will introduce the history of the American patent system, with particular 
emphasis on patents in the field of biotechnology.  Part I(B) will then discuss the basic 
science behind genes and the utility of isolated DNA.  Part II will introduce the legal 
debate concerning the patentability of isolated DNA with an overview of the Myriad 
cases.  Part III will discuss the economic advantages and disadvantages of gene patents 
and will introduce the arguments levied on both sides of the issue.  Part IV will conclude 
the paper with a summary of this author’s argument that gene patents act as integral 
incentives for biotechnological progress. 
I. INTRODUCTION TO GENE PATENTS 
¶3  To understand the debate over gene patents, it is necessary to first delve into the 
history of patent law and its connection to the current biotechnology industry.   
A. Why Protect Science? 
¶4  The authority of the United States government to grant temporary exclusionary 
rights
1
 to inventors in order to promote science is deeply ingrained in American history.  
In 1788, the States ratified the U.S. Constitution, which included Article 1 § 8 cl. 8, 
giving Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”
2
  The Constitution thus empowered Congress to set 
up a system that turned innovation into a property right, thereby allowing a market 
 
*
 Juris Doctor Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013. 
1
 Patents are often considered temporary monopolies over the patented invention.  While monopolies 
prevent competition within a market, patents merely give the patent holder the right to exclude others from 
making, using, and selling his invention.  Competitors may still make and sell their own inventions as long 
as they do not infringe on the patented invention.  For a more thorough explanation of the differences 
between patents and monopolies, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 108 (1990). 
2
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 





  The first Patent Act was enacted in 1790, setting forth the power of 
the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Department of War, and Attorney General to grant 




¶5  The current Patent Act,5 enacted in 1952, continues in the tradition of the First 
Congress.  The lenient attitude toward the scope of patentable inventions was 
demonstrated in the legislative history of the Patent Act of 1952, which states that patents 
are available for “anything under the sun that is made by man.”
6
  The Patent Act sets 
forth eligible subject matter as “any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. ”
7
 
¶6  Of course, controversies arose as science blurred the line between nature and 
invention.  In 1980, the Supreme Court of the United States extended patent eligibility to 
living, man-made organisms, ushering in the age of biotechnology.
8
  In Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, Dr. Chakrabarty created an entirely new strain of bacteria capable of 
breaking down multiple components of crude oil.  He did so by inserting non-native 
plasmids into the genome of a strain of naturally occurring bacteria that had been 
incapable of oil decomposition prior to the insertion of the plasmid.
9
  In a parallel to the 
passage of the Plant Patent Act, the Court stated that “the relevant distinction was not 
between living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether living or 
not, and human-made inventions.”
10
  Then in 1982, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) granted a patent to the University of California for the gene 
coding of insulin.
11
  Since then, genetic engineering, which involves scientific 
manipulation of DNA to introduce desirable traits, has gained an important foothold in 
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.  In the late 1990s, the number of patents 
on genes worldwide increased rapidly: from around 1,175 granted between the years 
1981 and 1995 to over 25,000 DNA-based patents by 2000.
12
  Gene patents have been 
granted under the rationale that “isolated DNA is a discrete chemical compound and . . . 





 Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 248 (1994). 
4
 1 Con. Ch. 7, April 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 190. 
5
 The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), signed into law in 2011, does not affect the issues 
presented in this article.  For the full text of the AIA, see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). 
6
 Committee Report accompanying 1952 Patent Act, S. Rep. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 22 Sess., 5 (1952); 
H.R. Rep. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1952).  See also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980) (citing the Patent Act of 1952 in the decision to allow Chakrabarty’s patent over a live organism 
since its genome was man-made). 
7
 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (2006). 
8
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
9
 Id. at 305. 
10
 Id. at 313 (referencing the “Plant Patent Act” 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1930)). 
11
 Lamis G. Eli, Note, When Myriad Genetics Prohibited a Myriad of Options: Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 21 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH., & INTELL. PROP.  L. 357, 360 (2011). 
12
 Bryn Williams-Jones, History of a Gene Patent: Tracing the Development and Application of 
Commercial BRCA Testing, 10 HEALTH L.J. 123, 126 (2002) (citing T.A. Caulfield and E.R. Gold, 
“Whistling in the Wind: Patents on Genetic Research Are a Reality. It’s Time to Reframe the Debate” 
(2000) Spring Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy 75; and Robert Mullan Cook-Deegan and 
Stephen J. McCormack, Patents, Secrecy, and DNA, 293 SCI. 217 (2001)). 
13
 Stephen W. Chen et al., Patent Protection in Medicine and Biotechnology: An Overview, 4 J. HEALTH 
& LIFE SCI. L. 106, 127–28 (2011). 
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The next section will introduce the scientific principles and historical facts underlying the 
debate about patent eligibility for genes. 
B. The Science Behind Gene Patents 
1. Genes Within the Body 
¶7  The human genome contains approximately 25,000 genes, each of which is coded 
by specific sequences of DNA.
14
  Genes are the units of heredity in living organisms, 
responsible for the inheritance of discrete traits.
15
  The information contained within the 
double-stranded DNA molecules that make up the human genome is encoded through a 
specific sequence of nucleotides.
16
  These nucleotides consist of a base linked to a 
phosphorylated deoxyribose molecule.  The DNA molecule resembles a twisting ladder, 
with a sugar “backbone” for the sides of the ladder and paired bases for the rungs.
17
  
Nucleotides link to other nucleotides within the DNA strand through the sugar 
backbone.
18
  The four different DNA bases (adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine) 
pair with their complements on the opposite strand to create the double helix structure of 
DNA.
19
  Adenine (“A”) pairs with thymine (“T”) and guanine (“G”) pairs with cytosine 
(“C”).  Three bases in sequence create a codon, which codes for a specific amino acid.
20
  
Amino acids are the building blocks of proteins, the basic functional units of the human 
body.
21
  A sequence of DNA that codes for a protein is called a gene. 
¶8  The process of creating proteins begins with a complete DNA molecule.  A gene is 
transcribed into an intermediate nucleic acid called messenger RNA (mRNA).
22
  The 
mRNA is then translated into the amino acid sequence of the protein.
23
  Like DNA, RNA 
consists of bases attached to a sugar-phosphate backbone.  However, RNA is only single-
stranded and uracil replaces the thymine base present in DNA.
24
  The mRNA sequence 
complements the DNA sequence from which it is transcribed.
25
  For example, an original 
DNA sequence of AAAGTAGCA is transcribed into the mRNA sequence 
UUUCAUCGU.  
¶9  Only small portions of the gene, called exons, functionally code for a protein.  The 
excess sequences, called introns, are spliced out of the mRNA before a protein is 
created.
26
  The resulting mRNA strand is about one-tenth the length of the gene that 
contains the coding sequence.
27
  Codons of the mRNA are then translated into specific 
 
14
 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
15
 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y 2010). 
16
 ALISON STEWART ET AL., GENETICS, HEALTH CARE AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
PUBLIC HEALTH GENETICS 24–25 (2007). 
17






 Id. at 25. 
21
 Id.; see also Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y 2010). 
22






 In RNA, adenine pairs with thymine, just as it does in DNA.  However, since uracil takes the place of 
thymine in RNA, uracil pairs with adenine in RNA. 
26
 JAIN, supra note 17, at 9. 
27
 Id. 
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amino acids.  For example, the previous mRNA sequence codes for the amino acid 
sequence Phenylalanine-Histidine-Arginine.  Some amino acids are specified by multiple 
codons, and some codons specify stop sequences, which instruct the cellular machinery to 
stop the process of transcription and translation at that codon.
28
  The amino acid 
sequence, called a polypeptide, folds into a functional three-dimensional structure: the 
protein.
29




¶10  Genomic DNA is not found floating within the cell ready to be transcribed into 
mRNA.  Rather, it is wound tightly around proteins called histones and packaged into 
twenty-three pairs of chromosomes.
31
  The chromosomes are directly inherited from an 
individual’s parents, twenty-three from the mother and twenty-three from the father.
32
  
When DNA is transcribed or replicated, only a small unit of the chromosome containing 
the gene of interest is unwound.
33
  
¶11  Changes, or mutations, in the genetic sequence of a gene can result in alterations in 
the resulting proteins.
34
  Mutations may be caused, for example, by environmental 
factors, errors in DNA processing, and inheritance (if the mutation occurs in a sex cell, 
also known as a germline mutation).
35
  Point mutations consist of a single nucleotide base 
change that can result in translation of a different amino acid.
36
  For instance, if the DNA 
sequence above began with a thymine instead of an adenine (TAAGTAGCA), the mRNA 
would become AUUCAUCGU.  The resulting polypeptide chain would consist of 
Leucine-Histidine-Arginine instead of Phenylalanine-Histidine-Arginine.  There will be 
little or no functional effect on the resulting protein when a point mutation occurs within 
a non-operative sequence of DNA (such as an intron), or when the sequence changes a 
codon that still encodes for the same or similar amino acid.
37
  However, when the point 
mutation substitutes a very different amino acid or codes for a stop sequence, it may lead 
to a vastly different protein—or even no protein at all.
38
  Larger scale changes in the 
DNA sequence include duplication, deletion, and rearrangement of large segments of 
DNA.
39
  The effects of these mutations vary according to the size and location of the 
altered sequence.
40
  Certain mutations are associated with particular diseases.  DNA 










 Id. at 26–27. 
31
 Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
32
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 195 (S.D.N.Y 2010). 
33
 JAIN, supra note 17, at 12. A single chromosome contains between 50–250 million base pairs, but 
only about 100,000 base pairs are unwound during replication or transcription. 
34
 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1339. 
35
 STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 31. 
36
 Id.; see also Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1338. 
37




 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1338. 
40
 STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 32. 
41
 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1338. 
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2. Isolated DNA: Process and Utility 
¶12  In 1990, the United States National Institutes of Health (NIH) launched the Human 
Genome Project, a $3 billion effort to create a detailed genetic and physical map of the 
entire human genome.
42
  This effort worked with national genome programs in several 
other countries to create a draft sequence of the entire human genome,
43
 which was 
published in Nature in 2001.
44
  Celera, a private company that had been simultaneously 
analyzing the human genome using different methods, published its own draft of the 
genome within the same week as the Human Genome Project.
45
  Since the Human 
Genome Project created the “reference sequence,”
46
 focus has turned to using the 
sequence to identify and characterize genes, their functional sequences, and the products 
of the genome.
47
   
¶13  An important step in the process of genetic sequencing involves extracting and 
purifying DNA from its cellular environment.
48
  Several well-established laboratory 
techniques exist for DNA extraction.
49
  Often, specific DNA segments are cut from the 
chromosomal DNA through the use of restriction enzymes.
50
  Sections of DNA can then 
be separated by size using gel electrophoresis.
51
  DNA that has been extracted from the 
non-DNA materials in the cell is legally termed “extracted DNA.”
52
  “Purified DNA” 
refers to DNA that has been further refined to separate a particular segment of DNA, such 
as a specific gene.
53
  Scientists can also synthesize, or create, DNA molecules in the 
laboratory if the sequence is known.
54
  This artificial DNA is termed “synthesized 
DNA.”
55
  “Isolated DNA,” consists of a “free-standing portion of a native DNA 
molecule, frequently a single gene.”
56
  It may be extracted and purified from native DNA 
or synthesized using a known sequence.
57
 
¶14  Purified and synthesized DNA may be used as laboratory tools in applications for 
which native DNA may not be used.
58
  For example, laboratory applications often require 
 
42
 JAIN, supra note 17, at 11.   
43
 IAN D. YOUNG, MEDICAL GENETICS 5 (2005). 
44
 Int’l Human Genome Sequencing Consortium, Initial Sequence and Analysis of the Human Genome, 
409 NATURE 860 (2001). 
45
 J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291 SCI. 1304 (2001).  Considerable 
controversy exists concerning Celera’s ability to sequence the human genome without the use of publicly 
available maps and sequence data from the Human Genome Project. See STEWART, supra note 16, at 55 for 
an analysis of Celera’s methods. 
46
 The reference sequence does not represent a single human individual, but was assembled from the 
DNA sequences of multiple volunteers. 
47
 STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 57. 
48
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 196 (S.D.N.Y 2010). See also STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 48 
(giving a more technical explanation of recombinant DNA technology). 
49
 Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
50
















 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196. 
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large amounts of the sequence of interest.
59
  There are two main methods of copying and 
amplifying (i.e. making multiple copies of) DNA.
60
  The first method, molecular cloning, 
harnesses the replication properties of a host organism, often a single-celled organism.
61
  
The target DNA is inserted into the host genome through the use of a vector, which 
includes all the necessary sequence information to make the host copy the target DNA 
when it multiplies.
62
  The second method of DNA amplification is called polymerase 
chain reaction (PCR).
63
  PCR amplifies DNA exponentially and does not require a living 
organism to do so.
64
  The drawback, however, is that PCR requires a DNA primer, a short 
piece of complement DNA that binds to each end of the replicating strand.
65
  This means 
that DNA may only be amplified using PCR when at least a portion of the sequence is 
known. 
¶15  Aside from their use in PCR amplification, DNA primers may also be used to 
determine the sequence of nucleotides in a DNA molecule in the first place.
66
  Short 
sequences of nucleotides labeled with fluorescent tags can also be used as “probes,” 
which are diagnostic tools often used in conjunction with DNA microarrays to detect 
thousands of genes within a single sample.
67
  Probes bind with complementary sequences 
in a sample of DNA within a microarray and tag the specific sequence so it may be 
detected by laboratory hardware.
68
  Overall, the utility of a purified gene or sequence of 
interest depends upon its ability to selectively bind to a complementary DNA sequence.
69
 
II. THE MYRIAD CASES 
A. Introduction to the Debate: BRCA1/2 
¶16  Even before the Human Genome Project mapped the genome, researchers have 
been associating diseases with particular genes and genetic mutations.  For instance, 
researchers at Myriad Genetics, Inc. and the University of Utah Research Foundation 
(collectively known as “Myriad”) identified the basis by which genetic mutations of the 
BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes correlate with an increased risk of breast and ovarian 
cancer.
70
  About 5% of all breast cancer cases involve germline mutations of either the 
BRCA1 or BRCA2 (BRCA1/2) genes.
71
  If an individual tests positive for mutations on 
 
59










 Id. at 51.  See also Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 197 (S.D.N.Y 2010).. 
65
 STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 51. 
66
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196. 
67
 See STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 51 (explaining the use of probes in microarrays); see also 
Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 196–97 (referencing the use of short DNA sequences as probes to be used as 
diagnostic tools). 
68
 STEWART ET AL., supra note 16, at 51. 
69
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 197. 
70
 Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  See also Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); cf. JAIN, supra note 17, at 155 (stating that mutations in the BRCA1 gene are present in 5% of 
ovarian cancer cases of women diagnosed before the age of 70). 
71
 YOUNG, supra note 43, at 200. 
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either BRCA gene, she
72




¶17  Myriad used known scientific processes to identify, isolate, and sequence the 
BRCA1/2 genes.
74
  The researchers then developed diagnostic tools to test individuals for 
mutations in the BRCA1/2 genes.
75
  Myriad filed a patent application covering the 
isolated and purified DNA containing the BRCA1 gene as well as the diagnostic methods 
in 1994, followed by an application covering the BRCA2 DNA and diagnostics in 1995.
76
  
The first BRCA1 patent was issued to Myriad in 1997, and the first BRCA2 patent was 
issued in 1998.
77
  Other clinical BRCA1/2 testing services became available while 
Myriad was in the process of using and patenting the BRCA1/2 genes.
78
  In early 1998, 
Myriad sent one such institution, the University of Pennsylvania’s Genetic Diagnostic 
Laboratory (“GDL”), a letter informing it of Myriad’s patents over the BRCA1 gene and 
diagnostics, and proposing a collaborative license agreement.
79
  The proposed license 
would have limited GDL’s testing services.
80
  Later in the year, GDL received a letter 
from a law firm that represented Myriad, giving GDL two choices: (1) agree to a 
licensing arrangement with the company, or (2) “cease all infringing testing activity.”
81
  
In the letter, Myriad told GDL that it could continue using BRCA testing “for the purpose 
of furthering non-commercial research programs.”
82
  This would have allowed GDL to 
perform BRCA testing as long as patients were not informed of the outcome and GDL 
received no payment.
83
  During this time, Myriad also sent cease-and-desist letters and 
initiated several patent infringement suits against providers of clinical BRCA diagnostic 
testing.
84
  Since 1999, Myriad has continued to be the only provider of clinical genetic 
testing for BRCA1/2 mutations in the United States.
85
  The plaintiffs in Association for 
Molecular Pathology v. United States Patent and Trademark Office (Myriad I) filed a suit 






 Male carriers of BRCA1/2 mutations are predisposed to prostate and colon cancer, Kenneth P. 
Tercyak et al., Parental Communication of BRCA1/2 Genetic Testing Results to Children, 42 PATIENT 
EDUC. & COUNSELING 213, 213 (2001), though this predisposition is less severe than the female equivalent.  
Males also have about a 5% chance of developing breast cancer within their lifetimes if they have a 
germline mutation of the BRCA2 gene.  YOUNG, supra note 43, at 200. 
73
 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1339. 
74
 Id.  The genetic basis for familial breast and ovarian cancer was identified through a process known as 
positional cloning.  Id.  Researchers identified families with inherited breast and ovarian cancers, gathered 
large sets of DNA, and compared the occurrence of cancer with certain markers on the DNA sequences.  Id. 
75








 Id. at 1339–40. 
80








 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad I), 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 205–06 (S.D.N.Y 2010), 
rev'd in part and aff'd in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. 
Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal 
reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
85
 Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1340. 
86
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 186. 
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B. Myriad I: United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
1. Opponents of Gene Patents 
¶18  The Plaintiffs in Myriad I roughly broke down into two groups: (1) those who were 
actually injured by Myriad’s patent rights over the BRCA1/2 genes and diagnostics, and 
(2) those who represent others with concrete interests in the availability of BRCA1/2 
testing sites.  The first group included several patients who could not afford Myriad’s 
testing as well as Dr. Kazazian, who received a cease-and-desist letter from Myriad and 
ceased BRCA1/2 testing as a result.
87
  The latter group included patients’ rights groups 
such as Breast Cancer Action and medical societies such as the College of American 
Pathologists.
88
  Several amicus briefs were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, arguing that 
Myriad’s patents were directed at unpatentable subject matter and violated medical 
ethics, among other arguments.
89
 
2. Proponents of Gene Patents 
¶19  The case was brought against three different defendants.  Defendant Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., a for-profit biotechnology company, is the exclusive licensee of the 
patents-in-suit.
90
  It is the only institution currently providing commercial BRCA1/2 
testing in the United States.
91
  Defendant University of Utah Research Foundation took 
part in the research that led to the BRCA1/2 patents and is the owner and co-owner of 
some of the patents-in-suit.
92
  Defendant United States Patent and Trademark Office, a 
government agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce,
93
 granted the patents-in-
suit to Myriad in 1998 and 1999.
94
  Amici curiae for defendants include non-profit trade 
associations, a health advocacy organization, for-profit corporations, and a public 
university.
95
  The amici contend that the patents-in-suit fall within the requirements of 35 
U.S.C. § 101 and also add that a ban on isolated DNA patents is an undesirable public 





 Id. at 187–89. 
88
 Id. at 186–88. 
89
 Id. at 190.  The amicus briefs submitted by several non-profit public health organizations including 
the National Women’s Health Network contends that patents over isolated DNA “stifl[e] innovation and 
interfer[e] with patient access to medical testing and treatment.”  Id.  Another amicus brief submitted by 
two non-profit organizations dedicated to protecting indigenous people argued that gene patents violate the 
public trust doctrine and patients’ rights to informed consent.  Id. 
90
 Id. at 189. 
91
 Id. at 189. 
92
 Id. at 189–90; see also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329, 1333 
(Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 
2012). 
93
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 189. 
94
 See Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1339. 
95
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 190-92.  Amici curiae also include a law professor and a patent attorney. 
96
 Id.  Amici also contend that the claims-in-suit are sufficiently limited to avoid claiming products of 
nature. 
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3. Court Opinion 
¶20  After discussing factual issues, the court considered the issue of law that is of 
greatest importance to this article: whether the composition claims over the isolated 
BRCA1/2 DNA were valid under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
97
  The court first considered whether 
there was an issue of law or fact upon which to test the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims (in 
other words, whether summary judgment should be granted to defendants).
98
  Defendants 
argued that patents are afforded a presumption of validity
99
 and cited the USPTO’s own 
prior consideration of the validity of gene patents.
100
  The court rejected the proposed 
“rule of judicial deference to the USPTO’s practices,” noting that 40% of patents 
challenged in courts are found to be invalid and 74% of patents challenged through 
reexamination are either canceled or changed by the USPTO itself.
101
   
¶21  Myriad also argued that constitutional property rights apply to its patents.  It argued 
that “invalidating the patents-in-suit would constitute an unconstitutional taking in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment . . . or a violation of the United States’ obligations 
under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS).”
102
  The court rejected the arguments as “unpersuasive,” stating that Myriad’s 
takings argument was novel and runs counter to the history of patent claim invalidation 
by the courts.
103
  The court also stated that TRIPS allows governments to consider public 
health concerns in the development of its intellectual property law.
104
 
¶22  Next, the court considered whether the matter covered by the patents was 
“markedly different” from a product of nature and decided that isolated DNA is not 
“markedly different” from native DNA.
105
  The “markedly different” terminology was 
taken from Chakrabarty, in which the Court stated that “the patentee has produced a new 
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature and one 
having the potential for significant utility.”
106
  The court in Myriad I explained that for 
the purposes of § 101, “markedly different characteristics” are those that have “a new or 





 The court also considered the validity of several other patent claims, including two methods claims 
over the analysis and comparison of DNA and comparison of the growth rate of cells—which the court 
invalidated as unpatentable abstract mental processes and the application of the scientific method itself.  Id. 
at 232–37.  The court dismissed the constitutional claim brought against the USPTO, following the doctrine 
of constitutional avoidance.  The court stated that it was unnecessary to reach the constitutional question 
because the patents issued by the USPTO were invalidated.  Id. at 237–38. 
98
 Id. at 220. 
99
 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
100
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 220–21.  See also Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 
1092–99 (Jan. 5, 2001); J.E.M. Ag Supply v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001) (finding the 
USPTO’s policy of granting utility patents for plants that pass the Chakrabarty “man-made” test 
establishes that the plants in question could be patented). 
101
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 221. 
102
 Id. at 221. 
103
 Id. at 221–22. 
104
 Id. at 222. It is interesting to note that the court rejected the consideration of public health concerns 
and other policy as factual disputes outside the context of the motions, id. at 211, and yet cites an allowance 
in the treaty to consider such concerns to exclude diagnostic methods from patentability, id. at 222. 
105
 Id. at 222, 227–28, 232.  For a discussion of the scientific differences between “isolated and purified” 
DNA and naturally occurring DNA, see supra Part I(B). 
106
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 310 (1980). 
107
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 223 (quoting Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 11 (1931), in 
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¶23  The court rejected Myriad’s argument that the process of isolation and purification 
changed the chemical nature of the DNA in question in such a way as to create patentable 
subject matter.
108
  The court contrasted DNA with other chemical compounds eligible for 
patent protection, stating that the unique informational quality of DNA makes it the 
“physical embodiment of laws of nature.”
109
  The unique qualities of all DNA, the court 
asserted, rendered the structural and functional differences between Myriad’s isolated 
BRCA1/2 genes and naturally occurring DNA inadequate to make the patented genes 
markedly different from their natural counterparts.
110
  The court then rejected the 
structural differences between natural DNA and isolated DNA as merely differences in 
purity, which cannot establish patent eligibility.
111
 
¶24  The court further rejected Myriad’s argument that native DNA contains introns, 
while the patents-in-suit cover purified DNA containing only exons.
112
  To do so, the 
court looked to the language of the patent claims, several of which cover DNA “coding 
for a BRCA1[/2] polypeptide,” which inherently includes DNA with introns, as well as 
solely exons.
113
  The court stated that the functional, coding portions of the DNA 
sequences are identical between the claimed DNA and naturally occurring chromosomal 
DNA.
114
  Overall, the court decided that DNA’s inherent utility in therapeutics and 
diagnostics arises from its ability to bind selectively with antiparallel DNA segments.
115
  
Since this utility is unchanged by the isolation and purification of genetic DNA in a 
laboratory, the function of isolated DNA is not markedly different from that of native 
DNA.
116




C. Myriad II: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
¶25  In a plurality opinion issued in July of 2011, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision that isolated and purified BRCA1/2 genes 




which the Supreme Court rejected patent claims over fruit whose outer surface was treated with an anti-
mold composition.  The Court stated that although production of the fruit required “treatment, labor, and 
manipulation,” the fruit did not become an “article of manufacture” without possessing a “new or 
distinctive form, quality, or property” that the natural article lacks.). 
108
 Myriad I, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 224, 227. 
109
 Id. at 228. 
110
 Id. at 229.  The court also rejects Myriad’s contention that § 101 inquiries should focus on the 
differences between native and isolated DNA, rather than their similarities as overly broad and untenable.  
Id. 
111
 Id. at 229–30. 
112




 Id. This argument ignores the functions of introns which, while largely unknown, include sequences 
that may be involved with inhibition or over-expression of certain genes. See A.B. ROSE, Intron-Mediated 
Regulation of Gene Expression, in CURRENT TOPICS ON MICROBIOLOGY AND IMMUNOLOGY 277 (2008).   
115




 Id. at 232. 
118
 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated sub nom. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 
(2012), opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App'x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
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1. The Opinion of the Court 
¶26  After considering the issue of standing, the Court turned to the issue at hand: 
whether the composition claims covered patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  
The majority wrote that the Supreme Court’s construction of § 101 is broad, but not 
unlimited.
119
  Based on the decisions in Chakrabarty and Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. 
Kalo, the majority stated that the distinction between man-made invention and products 
of nature “turns on a change in the claimed composition’s identity compared with what 
exists in nature.”
120
  These changes must be “markedly different” or “distinctive.”
121
 
¶27  Unlike the lower court, the majority in Myriad II decided that the chemical 
manipulation of the BRCA1/2 genes that removed it from the genome and created 
isolated BRCA1/2 DNA changed the DNA from a natural material to a distinct chemical 
entity.
122
  The majority rejected the lower court’s method of basing the distinctiveness of 
isolated DNA on the single similarity it shares with its naturally occurring antecedent: the 
information contained within the nucleotide sequence.
123
  The Court rejected the creation 
of a categorical rule preventing patent eligibility for isolated genes, stating that the 
Supreme Court has cautioned courts against adding limitations to patent laws that were 
not expressed by the legislature.
124
  Finally, unlike the lower court in Myriad I, the 
majority also gave deference to the “longstanding” USPTO practice that allowed for the 
patentability of isolated DNA molecules.
125
 
2. Judge Moore’s Partial Concurrence 
¶28  Judge Moore’s partial concurrence agreed with the majority as to the issue of 
standing, but disagreed with the majority’s reasoning for the allowance of isolated DNA 
as patent-eligible subject matter.
126
  Through a scientific explanation of DNA as a simple 
polymer, Judge Moore emphasized the functional differences between fragments of DNA 
molecules and the entire genomic structure found in nature.
127
  The concurrence 
challenged the lower court’s contention that isolation of genes is akin to separating out 
impurities from a naturally occurring mineral.
128
  The analysis emphasized the chemical 
 
119
 Id. at 1348 (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (relying upon Chakrabarty for the 
notion that Congress intended patent laws to be given wide scope)). 
120
 Id. at 1351 (building upon the rules in Chakrabarty and Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 
333 U.S. 127 (1948) (invalidating a patent covering a mixture of certain strains of bacteria that do not 
naturally cohabitate)). 
121




 Id. at 1353 (stating that “the patent eligibility of an isolated DNA is not negated because it has similar 
informational properties to a different, more complex natural material that embodies it”). 
124
 Id. See also Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3226, 561 U.S. __. 
125
 See Myriad II, 653 F.3d at 1354. 
126
 Id. at 1358.  The concurrence also agreed with the majority’s opinion with regard to the affirmation 
of the lower court’s rejection of the method claims, as well as the majority’s conclusion that the cDNA 
sequences are patentable.  With regard to the composition claims on isolated DNA, the concurrence agreed 
with the judgment, but not the reasoning.  Id. 
127
 Id. at 1361–62. 
128
 Id. at 1363. 
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and structural differences between excised (or synthesized) DNA fragments and those 
connected to a chromosome.
129
 
¶29  The concurrence, however, did not rely solely on the marked difference in chemical 
structure to deem isolated DNA patentable.
130
  Rather, the concurrence focused upon the 
utility gained by the difference in structure.
131
  Judge Moore gave weight to the possible 
uses of shorter sequences of isolated DNA as primers and probes.
132
  The concurrence did 
not go so far as to conclude that isolated DNA sequences that include an entire gene are 
eligible for patents based on structural and utility concerns alone.
133
  Instead, Judge 
Moore, like the majority, gave deference to the policies of the USPTO to allow patents 
for isolated natural products.
134
  Unlike the majority opinion, the concurrence also 
expressed deference for the expectations of the biotechnology industry and the thousands 
of isolated DNA patents already issued by the USPTO.
135
  Finally, the concurrence 
argued that the court is ill-suited to determine whether or not isolated DNA claims 




3. Judge Bryson’s Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent 
¶30  Judge Bryson’s partial concurrence disagreed with both the majority and Judge 
Moore’s concurrence with regard to the patentability of isolated DNA sequences.  Judge 
Bryson simplified the issue down to one question: Are human genes patentable?
137
  In a 
comparison with isolation of native minerals, Judge Bryson’s opinion stated that “merely 
isolating the products of nature by extracting them from their natural location and making 
those alterations attendant to their extraction does not give the extractor the right to patent 
the product themselves.”
138
  In the end, Judge Bryson formulated the rule that “the 
extraction of a product in a manner that retains the character and function of the product 
as found in nature does not result in the creation of a human invention.”
139
  In a move that 
seems to follow the argument of the lower court, Judge Bryson focused upon the 
similarity in function between the isolated BRCA1/2 genes and the genes within 
chromosomal DNA.
140
  The partial concurrence limited the patentability of isolated DNA 











 Id. at 1365.  See also supra Part I(B) for a discussion of DNA fragments as primers and probes. 
133
 Id. at 1366.  (In fact, Moore states that if she were to make the patentability decision based on a blank 
canvas, she might conclude that such a DNA sequence would not be patentable.) 
134
 Id. at 1367 (relying on 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001), which states that the USPTO’s policy 
that “[a]n isolated and purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is 
eligible for a patent because . . . that DNA molecule does not occur in that isolated form in nature”). 
135
 Id. at 1368.   
136
 Id. at 1372. 
137
 Id. at 1373. 
138
 Id. at 1375.  The dissent further argues against the majority’s fundamental conclusion that cleavage 
of the bonds between DNA and the histone proteins to isolate DNA chemically alters the identity of the 
DNA.  Rather, the dissent likens chemical bonds between atoms to weaker interatomic forces.  Id. 
139
 Id. at 1377. 
140
 Id. at 1376–77. 
141
 Id. at 1373.  The dissent also delves into the perceived danger of broad patent protection over genetic 
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D. Subsequent History of Myriad 
¶31  In 2012, the Supreme Court took on the issue of patents attempting to claim laws of 
nature in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.
142
  The Court 
invalidated method claims that optimized dosage of a drug for the treatment of certain 
autoimmune diseases.
143
  Justice Breyer asserted that merely stating a law of nature and 
writing “apply it” in the patent application does not satisfy the requirement that a process 
based upon a natural law must also contain an “inventive concept” that amounts to 
significantly more than a patent over the natural law itself.
144
  Just six days after the 
Supreme Court decided Mayo v. Prometheus, it vacated the opinion in Myriad II and 
remanded the case back to the Federal Circuit for consideration in light of Mayo. 
145
 
¶32  The Federal Circuit’s second review of Myriad resulted in a restatement of Myriad 
II’s findings for the composition claims.
146
  As before, the majority found that the 
composition claims directed to the “isolated” DNA and to cDNA cover patent eligible 
subject matter.
147
  Judge Lourie again emphasized the fact that the “isolated” DNA 
covered by the patent does not exist in its isolated form in nature.  Importantly, Judge 
Lourie addressed the Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo by stating that Mayo does not 
control the subject matter eligibility of composition claims.
148
  Therefore, Mayo did not 
affect the Federal Circuit’s decision in regards to the patent eligibility of “isolated” DNA 
and cDNA sequences. 
III. THE ECONOMICS OF GENE PATENTS 
A. Open-Source Science and Opponents of Gene Patents 
¶33  In 1948, the Supreme Court of the United States declared “manifestations of . . . 
nature, [are] free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”
149
  Though this doctrine 
has changed throughout the years, the sentiment that unchanged products of nature are 
unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 101 persists.
150
  Opponents of gene patents argue that 
isolated DNA, although chemically altered by the isolation process, is still a natural 
substance with the same utility as its native counterpart and therefore is ineligible for 
patent protection.
151
  Beyond the legal arguments described in the Myriad cases, 
 
material as a hindrance to future genetic innovation.  This argument, the threat of the anti-commons, is 
further discussed in Part III, infra. 
142
 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
143
 Id.  
144
 Id. at 1294.  In Mayo v. Prometheus, the patent at issue covered the application of a known 
correlation between a levels of certain metabolites in a patient’s blood and the efficacy of the drug 
thiopurine.  Id. 
145
 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012) (mem.) (granting cert 
and vacating opinion below allowing the patenting of extracted DNA and remanding for analysis in line 
with Mayo). 
146
 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
147
 Id. at 1309. 
148
 Id. at *15. 
149
 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
150
 See, e.g., Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
151
 See, e.g., Myriad II, 653 F.3d 1329 at 1378 (Bryson, J., dissenting); see generally Jonah D. Jackson, 
Note, Something Like the Sun: Why Even “Isolated and Purified” Genes are Still Products of Nature, 89 
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opponents present policy arguments against the patentability of genes.  These include the 
notion of the “tragedy of the anticommons” and an overall ethical question about the 
justification of incentives to the biotechnology industry. 
1. The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” 
¶34  In 1998, Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg published a highly influential 
article applying the notion of the “tragedy of the anticommons” to the patentability of 
biomedical research.
152
  The authors argue that patents on upstream technology—such as 
gene sequences—have the unintended consequence of stifling downstream innovation by 
imposing burdensome transaction costs.
153
  These transaction costs arise from the need to 
collect all the necessary licenses to use the upstream technologies.
154
 
¶35  Heller and Eisenberg allow that intellectual property protection in biomedical 
research incentivizes researchers to undertake risky research projects and could even help 
equitably distribute profits across the various stages of research and development.
155
  On 
the other hand, the authors argue that privatization limits future research when too many 
entities hold rights to discoveries that serve as obstacles to further research.
156
  Heller and 
Eisenberg predicted that patents on gene fragments would cause researchers developing 
therapeutic proteins and diagnostic tests to bundle licenses together before they could 
effectively develop the downstream technologies.
157
  This clearly relates to the Myriad 
cases, in which the exclusive licensee of the BRCA1/2 genes imposed high transaction 
costs on entities hoping to license the BRCA1/2 genes and perform their own diagnostic 
tests.
158
  Though the article suggests the possibility of the biomedical research 
community correcting its own anticommons problems in ways similar to the actions of 
the music industry, the authors identify several impediments to such a concerted 
action.
159
  These include the greater relative importance of patents to the biotechnology 
and pharmaceutical industries, the heterogeneity of interests of upstream rights holders, 
and even a cognitive bias on the part of patent holders to believe that their patents hold 
 
TEX. L. REV. 1453 (2011). 
152
 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in 
Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998).  Heller introduced the “tragedy of the anticommons” theory in 
broader application earlier that year in an article in the Harvard Law Review. See Heller, Michael, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 3, 621–
88 (1998). 
153
 Id. at 698.  The theory relates to Garrett Hardin’s metaphor in property law of the “tragedy of the 
commons,” which has been used to explain such phenomena as overpopulation, species distinction, and air 
pollution. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
154
 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Symposium, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (2008). 
155
 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 152, at 698. See also Thomas A. Hemphill, Gene Patents, The 
Anticommons, and the Biotechnology Industry, RES. TECH. MGMT., Sept.-Oct. 2010, at 11. 
156
 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 152, at 698. 
157
 Id. at 699.  When licenses are bundled together, researchers have the ability to pay one fee in order to 
use all the patented technologies within the bundle.  While this has the ability to speed up the process and 
lower the cost of licensing, it may also cause researchers to pay for licenses within the bundle that they 
would not have needed if the licenses had been obtained separately. Also, bundles create a hold out 
problem when one patent holder refuses to license his or her technology to others. 
158
 See supra Part II(B) for a discussion of the facts in Myriad.  Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. 
USPTO (Myriad II), 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
159
 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 152. 
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the “key” to downstream production, leading these patent holders to hold out for high 
licensing fees.
160
  The “tragedy of the anticommons” ultimately results in abandonment 
of research projects that have been deemed too costly from an IP licensing standpoint.
161
 
2. Ethics of Gene Patents 
¶36  Opponents of gene patents also present several ethical arguments, including 
consent issues involved in personalized medicine, and open source arguments for the 
dissemination of information.  Patients’ groups contend that certain gene patents violate 
individual human rights by bypassing patients’ informed consent.
162
  For instance, in 
2010, members of the Havasupai Native American tribe claimed that Arizona State 
University used their DNA samples in ways other than those agreed upon, and won 
$700,000 in an out-of-court settlement.
163
  One court treated DNA donors as “tissue 
sources” with no rights to be informed about the possible commercialization of the 
tissues to be donated.
164
 
¶37  Unlike in the United States, informed consent is governed by the European medical 
community through a directive of the European Union’s Parliament and Council states 
that persons from whose bodies biological material is being taken for biotechnological 
discovery “must have . . . an opportunity of expressing free and informed consent 
thereto.”
165
  Gene patent consent issues also sometimes involve religious beliefs and fears 
about genetic discrimination.
166
 Reproductive liberty issues also attach to the discussion 
of gene sequencing and patenting.
167
  An in-depth discussion of such ethical issues is 
outside the scope of this article. 
¶38  Opponents of patents also argue that the commercial incentives of patents will slow 
the process of technology by undermining the open-science research norm.
168
  Since the 
passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, universities and small businesses have had the 
ability to claim IP protection over federally funded discoveries.
169
  Patent opponents 
argue that this has led universities away from the historical ideal of open access to basic 
research.
170
  Traditionally, researchers were incentivized to keep science within the 
 
160
 Id. at 700–01. 
161
 See Jacob D. Moore, Note, The Forgotten Victim in the Human Gene Patenting Debate: 
Pharmaceutical Companies, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1277, 1291 (2011); see also Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 
152, at 700. 
162
 Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Gene Patents: The Need for Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal 
Change, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 403, 408 (2005). 
163
 Arthur Piper, Who Owns Human Nature?, 65 No. 2 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT, April 2011, at 47, 49. 
164
 Andrews & Paradise, supra note 162, at 410 (referring to Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp., 264 
F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003)). 
165
 Id. (citing Council and Parliament Directive 98/44/EC of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of 
Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 14, recital 26, 
http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/pri/en/oj/dat/1998/1_213/1_21319980730en001130021.pdf). 
166
 Id.; see also Piper, supra note 163, at 49 (discussing the taboo nature of schizophrenia research, 
which angered the Havasupai people). 
167
 Andrews & Paradise, supra note 162, at 410. 
168
 Timothy Caulfield et al., Evidence and Anecdotes: An Analysis of Human Gene Patenting 
Controversies, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1091, 1091 (2006). 
169
 STEPHEN A. MERRILL ET AL., REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 20, 24 (2006). 
170
 Richard R. Nelson, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons, 33 RES. POL’Y 455, 469 
(2004). 
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public domain because rewards to scientists were tied to acclaim within the community 
following the publication of peer-reviewed articles.
171
  More recently, many universities 
(and their researchers) are aiming to “maximize[] expected revenues from intellectual 
property.”
172
  This new incentive to patent takes away from the traditional open research 
incentives, leading to an increase in the secretive nature of academic research, delays in 
publication of findings, and resistance to sharing data and research materials.
173
 
B. Counter-Arguments to Opponents of Gene Patents 
1. The “Tragedy of the Anticommons” Is Not So Tragic 
¶39  Ten years after the publication of the Science article that catapulted the “tragedy of 
the anticommons” into the discussion of biotechnological patent policy, Rebecca 
Eisenberg admitted that “intellectual property has presented fewer impediments to 
research than policymakers may have projected on the basis of early salient 
controversies.”
174
  In an empirical study of the impact of patents on biomedical research 
in United States universities, a research team lead by John Walsh concluded that patents 
have had little detrimental impact upon academic researchers.
175
 Several other empirical 
studies reported similar findings.
176
  A study performed by the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which included both academic and private 
researchers, found that only 1% of survey respondents in the U.S. abandoned a research 
project as a result of the need to obtain patent licenses.
177
  Although approximately 20% 
of all human genes are covered by at least one patent, anticommons problems have been 
shown to be “relatively uncommon.”
178
  Eisenberg attributes the lack of obstacles 
demonstrated in the studies, in part, to the fact that such empirical studies tend to measure 
upstream rather than downstream innovation, but admits that the data demonstrate that 
the effects of the “tragedy of the anticommons” are far less serious than predicted.
179
 
¶40  Walsh then focused his research on the anticommons effect of patents covering 
upstream research tools upon downstream innovation.  He found that the patenting of 
upstream research tools has an insignificant effect on downstream diagnostic and 
therapeutic discovery.  Although there has been an increase in the number of patents on 
research tools in the last thirty years, those patents have not impeded biomedical 
 
171
 Id. at 455. 
172
 Id. at 469. 
173
 Caulfield, supra note 168, at 1091.  Most writing on the topic of open source science concerns basic 
science research and draws a definitive line between “basic” and “therapeutic” or “technology-based” 
science.  See Nelson, supra note 170, for an analysis of the open science opinion focusing solely on basic 
research.  See also Paul A. David, Can “Open Science” Be Protected from the Evolving Regime of IPR 
Protections 1-27 (Stanford Inst. Econ. Policy Research, Policy Paper No. 02-042, 2003)), for a call to 
action to halt the privatization of public domain information. 
174
 Eisenberg, supra note 154, at 1061. 
175
 John P. Walsh et al., Working Through the Patent Problem, 299 SCI. 1021 (2003). 
176
 Eisenberg, supra note 154. 
177
 AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
EXPERIENCES: A REPORT OF FOUR COUNTRIES 6–8 (2007), available at 
http://sippi.aaas.org/Pubs/SIPPI_Four_Country_Report.pdf. 
178
 Caulfield, supra note 168, at 1091. 
179
 Eisenberg, supra note 154, at 1075. 




  Several factors led to the rise in patents on research tools, including 
increased patenting by the biotech industry generally, the allowance of patents over 




¶41  The increase in the complexity of the patent landscape would lead believers in the 
anticommons problem to expect a resulting decrease in innovation.  Yet, the Walsh study 
found no such evidence.  In fact, of fifty-five researchers surveyed, only one reported an 
instance during which a breakdown in the negotiations for rights to a research tool 
resulted in the termination of a project.
182
  Also, though the number of licenses obtained 
by researchers has increased in recent years, the number appears to remain relatively 
small and the fees did not cause researchers to abandon projects.
183
  In fact, researchers 
reported “the productivity gains conferred by the licensed research tools were thought to 
be worth the price.”
184
  This shows that researchers are willing to bear the costs of 
licensing upstream research tools because they increase the productivity of downstream 
innovations. 
C. Benefits of Patents in the Realm of Biotechnological Innovation 
¶42  The private United States biotechnology (“biotech”) and pharmaceutical industry 
spent approximately $49 billion on biomedical research in 2006, accounting for 41% of 
national biomedical research spending.
185
  Private biotech and pharmaceutical companies 
“must invest hundreds of millions of dollars in research and development over many 
years to bring their products to market.”
186
 Estimates place the cost of developing and 
testing a new pharmaceutical entity in the 1980s and 1990s above $800 million.
187
  
Furthermore, this cost “has increased and seems destined to continue increasing,” causing 
 
180
 See John P. Walsh, et. al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, 
in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 
2003) (assessing the empirical evidence regarding effect of patents on research tools, or inputs to drug 
discovery, between the years 1986 and 2003). Gene sequence patents, like the patent at issue in the Myriad 
cases, can be considered patents on research tools because genetic sequences serve as starting points for 
further diagnostic and therapeutic research. 
181
 Id. at 294–95.  See also Caulfield, supra note 168 (explaining the rise of patenting by universities 
following the Bayh-Dole Act).  The term “defensive patenting” refers to the practice of patenting often 
used in the telecommunications industry in which each small part of an invention is patented separately in 
order to protect a company from a possible future infringement suit. See Walsh, supra note 180, at 295, for 
an example of defensive patenting. 
182
 Walsh, supra note 180, at 295. 
183
 Id. at 294–95, 300.  Researchers reported that while the number of patents that are initially 
considered for licensing is high—sometimes on the order of hundreds—the number of licenses that are 
necessary to obtain is “substantially smaller”—often closer to 3 to 6. 
184
 Id. at 301. 
185
 Elias A. Zerhouni, Special Communication, Nat’l Inst. Health, U.S. Biomedical Research: Basic, 
Translational, And Clinical Sciences, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1352 (2006). 
186
 MERRILL ET AL., supra note 169, at 20. 
187
 Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. 
HEALTH & ECON. 151–85 (2003) (estimating the cost for new chemical entities to be $820 million in year 
2000 dollars based on studies of pharmaceuticals developed between the years 1983 and 1994).  See also 
Michael Dickson & Jean Paul Gagnon, Key Factors in the Rising Cost of New Drug Discovery and 
Development, 3 NATURE REVIEWS 417, 424–26 (2004)(placing the cost of development of new 
pharmaceuticals as high as $897 million in year 2000 dollars). 
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pharmaceutical innovation to be more expensive today.
188
  Biotechnological innovation 
may in fact be more expensive than traditional pharmaceutical discovery.
189
  The increase 
in expense stems from the riskiness of the drug development process, higher research and 
development costs, and highly specialized manufacturing and distribution processes when 
compared with those for traditional chemical entities.
190
  More recent estimates place the 
cost of development of biopharmaceuticals—therapies based on mechanisms within the 
human body rather than strictly chemical compounds—above $1.2 billion.
191
   
¶43  The high cost of pharmaceutical innovation makes intellectual property protection 
“essential” to the industry.
192
  Studies demonstrate that the incentive effect of patents is 
more pronounced in the pharmaceutical industry than in other realms of science.
193
  One 
study demonstrated that biotech firms expect to earn between 45–79% more on patented 
inventions than they would earn on those inventions if they had not been patented.
194
  
Patents are especially important—even critical—to start-up companies, which require 
significant investment from outside sources.
195
  The surge in new entrants into the biotech 




¶44  The increased expense of biotechnological innovation further emphasizes the need 
for patent protection.  Without patents, innovation would be hindered by the 
“appropriability problem.”
197
  This doctrine states that if an entity is unable to recover the 
costs of research and development because the resulting information would be available 
to the general public, then there would be a suboptimal level of innovation.
198
  To 
contend with this problem without abandoning innovation, genetic researchers often turn 
to trade secrecy to protect the value of their discoveries.
199
  The use of trade secrets to 
protect DNA sequences limits the free flow of information within the research 
community.  The scientific community’s traditional emphasis on disclosure and 
information sharing would fall by the wayside if trade secret became the main method of 
intellectual property protection. 
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¶45  Patents simultaneously incentivize investment in innovation and disseminate 
information to the scientific community, solving both portions of the “appropriability 
problem.”
200
  In fact, most patents filed in the United States are published after eighteen 
months, establishing a limitation for the time period of secrecy for researchers who 
choose to patent their innovations by requiring that the invention is disclosed.
201
  In the 
case of patents covering DNA sequences, this publication rule restores the informational 
value contained within the DNA sequence.
202
  Some researchers even argue that patents 
facilitate the exchange of technological information “by forcing would-be copyists to 
invent around and or to pursue alternative avenues of research. . . .”
203
  For instance, a 
patent on a gene sequence claims only uses of the sequence itself, not the protein or 
smaller expressed sequence tags (ESTs) of cDNA.  Researchers are encouraged to 
discover the use of the protein without dealing directly with the gene sequence.
204
  The 
existence of patents may actually spur superior scientific advances by forcing researchers 
to develop new technology that works around existing patents. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶46  In the case of isolated genes, patent eligibility acts as a critical incentive for 
scientific research.  The costs of research and development of research therapies act as a 
barrier-to-entry that may only be overcome through the influx of capital supplied by 
investors looking to make a return on their investment.  As the costs of research, 
development, and testing have soared within the biotech industry, patents have become 
crucial to start-up companies and established companies alike. Thus, useful, often life-
changing, technologies would never be available to patients if not for the USPTO’s 
decades-long practice of granting gene patents. 
¶47  Opponents of gene patents argue that the allowance of exclusive rights over 
upstream research technology will have a deleterious effect on downstream innovation.
205
  
Researchers termed this theory the “tragedy of the anticommons.”
206
  Empirical studies 
have shown that the “tragedy of the anticommons” does not exist within the realm of 
biotechnology.
207
  Though patents on upstream research tools have increased throughout 
the years, downstream technology has not been hindered.
208
 
¶48  In the words of the U.S. Constitution, patents “promote the progress of science and 
useful arts”
209
 by incentivizing both discovery and disclosure.  Gene patents provide 
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important monetary incentives for companies developing downstream technology without 
violating the traditional open information norm of the scientific community.  Empirical 
data has shown the “tragedy of the anticommons” to have an insignificant practical effect 
upon biomedical innovation, while gene patents themselves spur innovation by providing 
for an influx of capital for corporations performing important biotechnological research.  
Without gene patents, researchers lose out on a large source of potential funding and may 
turn to trade secrets to protect discoveries.  Overall, gene patents lead to important 
medical discoveries by incentivizing research, providing for monetary capital, and 
allowing the free flow of scientific information. 
 
 
